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Abstract 
 
Based on prospect theory, we develop a theoretical framework to unify divided views 
on land reallocation reform in China. Our theoretical framework and empirical 
verification explain the driving forces behind the success of the rural land reallocation 
reform in China. We find that rural land reallocation reform in China is characterized 
by induced and imposed institutional changes. The relationship between induced and 
imposed institutional change is complementary instead of competing. The decision 
and frequency of land reallocation are affected by both local endowment and central 
government policy. Empirical findings also suggest that land reallocation reform in 
China is incremental, with interim policy targets from different stages taking gradual 
effect. The incremental implementation of the “No Reallocation” policy is the reason 
behind the widespread, diversified land reallocation practices across the country; this 
policy also contributes to the success of rural land reform in China. The theoretical 
model can be used to study a wide range of government-led institutional changes in 
China, such as affordable housing schemes and the National New-type Urbanization 
Plan (2014-2020).  
  
Keywords: Land reallocations; Induced and imposed institutional change; 
Prospect theory; Land market in China.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Rural land market reform in China can be traced back to the introduction of the 
Household Responsibility System in the late 1970s. After three decades of market 
reform and urbanization, 36.3% of Chinese still lives in rural areas
1
, which account 
for over 70% of the total land area in China; the agricultural sector contributes only 
10% to the national GDP (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). The proportion of 
rural population is still well above developed nations’ average of 20%. As revealed in 
the nation’s first urbanization plan in March 2014, China will speed up the country’s 
urbanization process to foster sustainable and healthy economic growth.  Rural 
sector plays an important role in this challenging undertaking. Theories of 
development economics suggest that agricultural growth is crucial for 
industrialization and economic development (see e.g., Schultz, 1964; Hayami & 
Ruttan, 1971). Improving productivity in rural China is of great importance for food 
security and the national economy. To achieve this goal, one of the most effective 
tools is granting land-use rights and residual income rights to rural households (Lin, 
1992; de Soto, 2000).   
 
In rural China, arable lands are jointly owned by groups of rural residents in the same 
village. The term “collective” is coined for such groups of rural households. Under a 
collectively owned land right system, a piece of land on per capita basis is allocated to 
each villager. Payoff for individuals is determined not by their own productivity, but 
by the overall productivity of their collective. Specifically, output from individuals are 
pooled first and then equally distributed among all members of the collective. 
Collectivization achieves the ideological goal of equal access to land. However, the 
system is inefficient because villagers are not provided enough incentives to 
contribute to the collective and their motivation to free-ride is strong (see e.g., Kojima, 
1988; Kochin, 1996). In the late 1970s, the Household Responsibility System 
emerged quietly through experiments by villagers who were supported by their local 
governments. The System essentially gave villagers the right to retain residual income 
from lands allocated to them and marked the start of the Decollectivization Reform 
(Diamond, 1985).  
 
Decollectivization is one of the most important institutional changes in the history of 
modern China because it fundamentally altered the land-use rights system in rural 
China and significantly improved agricultural productivity (see e.g., Nolan, 1983; 
Kojima, 1988; Lin, 1992; Gaynor & Putterman, 1993; Li et al., 1998; Deininger & Jin, 
2003). It also fueled the industrialization and urbanization processes by moving 
surplus rural labor force to other sectors (Lin, 1992; Binswanger, et al., 1995). 
                                                             
1
 This figure includes residents who actually live in rural areas only. Unregistered migrant works (18% 
of the total population by the end of 2013) that live in urban areas are not included. Unregistered 
urban residents do not have access to basic urban public services such as education, medical care, and 
pensions.  
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Empirical evidence shows that employment share in the agricultural sector dropped 
by almost 50% from 1978 to 2007 while productivity growth rate outperformed all 
other sectors for most of this period (Zhu, 2012, Table 2, pp. 111). The success of the 
Household Responsibility System was celebrated by the public and formally 
recognized by the central government (See Ash, 1988 for a chronological account of 
the agricultural reform in China). The next challenge in Decollectivization Reform is 
to adjust the system so it can keep up with the rapid urbanization and economic 
reform in China, an objective that can mainly be achieved through land reallocation 
reform.  
   
In decollectivization, the land is still collectively owned. Although the exchange of 
land-use rights was endorsed by the central government in 1984, the rural land rental 
market was only formally established in 2002 when the Rural Land Contract Law was 
passed by Congress. The development of the rural land rental market (i.e., rural 
land-use rights exchange market) has been slow. Land reallocation remains the only 
effective way of adjusting land allocation to meet demographic changes and economic 
development in rural China (see e.g., Kung, 1995 & 2000; Liu et al., 1998; Benjamin 
& Brandt, 2002). Broadly speaking, land reallocation has two types. A full 
reallocation (da tiaozheng) takes back all or most land holdings and redistributes them 
among all households in the collective. A partial reallocation (xiao tiaozheng) only 
involves land holdings and households affected by demographic changes. 
Understandably, full reallocations are less frequent than partial reallocations in 
practice because it is associated with a greater level of land rights insecurity.  
 
Determining the frequency and scale of land reallocation is a delicate issue (Wang et 
al., 2011). Land-use rights should be granted to households for a sufficiently long 
period of time to justify long-term investment in land holdings. Frequent and/or 
large-scale reallocation results in tenure insecurity, and consequently discourages 
investment in land holdings (Li et al., 1998; Brandt et al., 2002; Jacoby et al., 2002). 
By contrast, rapid urbanization in China causes fast demographic changes in rural 
China (Cai & Wang, 2010; Peng, 2011). Timely reallocation is necessary to address 
resource mismatch and ensure equal access to farmland by all members of collectives. 
How can tenure security and land-use efficiency be balanced? What is the driving 
force of land reallocation? These important questions cannot be answered without 
understanding the dynamics between the local and central governments in land 
reallocation.   
 
Lin (1989) claims that institutional change can be broadly classified into two 
categories. The first one, induced institutional change, is usually initiated by and 
experimented in private sectors and adopted by the government after being proved 
successful. The second type, imposed institutional change, is prescribed top-down by 
the state and is often associated with drastic social, economic, or legal adjustments. 
The difference between these two types of institutional change rests in involved 
political and economic risks. Induced institutional change is allowed or even 
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encouraged by the central government when the reform involves low political risk and 
significant economic gains, whereas imposed institutional change is preferred for 
decisions that may cause substantial political loss but great economic uncertainty 
(Zhang, 2012). Consequently the payoffs must be sufficiently large to justify imposed 
institutional changes such that the expected gains can outweigh the expected costs.  
Imposed institutional changes are also necessary when parties with conflicting 
interests are involved. Without such top-down interventions the supply of institutional 
changes might not be sufficient due to rent-seeking behaviors and free-rider issues 
(Lin, 1989; North, 1990; Lin & Nugent, 1995).  
 
According to this framework, the Decollectivization Reform started as induced 
institutional change. The Household Responsibility System was first experimented 
with in remote and disadvantaged villages in China, where the stake of failure is low. 
The success of the System later ignited nationwide adaptation and led to the formal 
reorganization by the state. However, the nature of the current stage of 
decollectivization (i.e., land reallocation reform) is still open for debate. If left 
unsupervised, land reallocation is likely to pose a serious threat to tenure security and 
discourage farmland investment. Therefore, state intervention is inevitable. One 
would expect that both imposed and induced institutional changes are in force. 
However, empirical evidence suggests that state intervention is ineffective.    
 
First, stylized evidence shows that the goals of the local and central governments do 
not align. For example, Deininger and Jin (2009) find that almost 30% of the villages 
surveyed in their study have undergone land reallocation since 2000. However, as 
early as in 1984, the state has stipulated that land-use rights should be contracted to 
villagers for a minimum of 15 years, which was extended to 30 years in 1993. 
Land-use rights are taken back from villagers before the end of their contract when 
lands are reallocated, which negatively affects tenure security, farmland investment, 
and agricultural productivity. A “persistence of seemingly inefficient institutions” is at 
work (Kung & Bai, 2011). This condition is in stark contrast to the “federalism with 
political centralization” model, where the local government is given incentives and 
the freedom to foster economic growth while the central government maintains a 
strong and disciplined control by rewarding or punishing local administrations 
(Blanchard & Shleifer, 2001). This model is recognized as the key success factor of 
the economic growth of China (Blanchard & Shleifer, 2001; Xu, 2011). However, it 
does not seem to work for land reallocation reform. Land reallocation rules laid out by 
the central government are duly ignored by local governments. 
  
The academia also pays little attention to the role of the government. Most studies on 
land reallocation are based on the induced institutional change hypothesis (see e.g., 
Brandt et al., 2004; Yao, 2004a & 2004b; Kung & Bai, 2011; Wang et al., 2011), and 
the results are mixed. Some empirical evidence supports the induced institutional 
change hypothesis (Yao, 2004a & 2004b), but other studies favor the transaction cost 
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hypothesis (Kung & Bai 2011)
2
. Brandt et al. (2004) find rent-seeking behaviors and 
the duty of village leaders to meet tax and quota obligations as the most important 
reasons to reallocate land. They conclude that the best way to enhance rural land 
tenure security is to change the incentives for village leaders. The theoretical 
framework and empirical findings from these studies provide valuable insight into 
rural land reallocation reform in China. However, the role of state intervention hardly 
has any evidence. Some researchers justify this approach by stating that the policies of 
the central government are simply ignored by local authorities (see e.g., Brandt et al., 
2004, pp. 629). Others choose to seek alternative economic justifications for this 
apparent inefficiency, such as the transaction costs hypothesis tested in Kung and Bai 
(2011). The role of state intervention is discussed in some studies (see e.g., Deininger 
& Jin, 2009) but never formally incorporated in the theoretical framework of any of 
the studies. This approach is convenient for establishing econometric models, but at 
the expense of overlooking national policy as an important determinant of 
institutional changes.  
 
The objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework to bridge this gap. 
We start with the model of Lin (1989) by considering induced and imposed 
institutional changes as the driving forces in land reallocation reform in China. We 
argue that the relationship between the two forces is complementary. At a different 
stage of economic reform, one force may be more effective than the other. However, 
neither one ceases affecting rural land reform at any stage. We revise and extend Lin’s 
(1989) model in two ways. First, we adopt the revised definition of induced 
institutional change proposed by Zhang (2012) to establish a clear and logical link 
between the two types of institutional changes. Second, we adopt prospect theory (PT) 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) to model the dynamics between induced and imposed 
institutional changes. This adoption leads to the construction of a model that links all 
stakeholders involved in land reallocation. The theoretical framework is examined 
using a unique dataset collected from a longitudinal village survey in 17 Chinese 
provinces from 1999 to 2010
3
. We conclude that rural land reallocation reform in 
China is driven by both induced and imposed institutional changes. Our theoretical 
framework and empirical verification explain the driving forces behind the success of 
the rural land reallocation reform in China. The success of the reform largely 
contributes to the incremental approach realized by a combination of induced and 
imposed institutional changes. The findings offer empirical support to property rights 
economics and institutional change theories (see, for example, Lin, 1989; North, 1990; 
de Soto, 2000). The theoretical model can be used to study a wide range of 
government-led institutional changes in China, such as affordable housing schemes 
and the National New-type Urbanization Plan (2014-2020). 
                                                             
2 Transaction cost theory and induced institutional change theory are closely related. Reducing 
transaction cost is one of the important considerations in induced institutional change theory.  
Whether their relationship is complementary or substitutive is still open to debate. 
3
 Based on five surveys conducted by Renmin University of China (RUC) and Rural Development 
Institute (RDI) in the US. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The development of the 
theoretical framework and testable hypotheses are given in Section 2, followed by the 
descriptions of data and survey background information in Section 3. Empirical 
evidence and discussions are presented in Section 4 and Section 5. The conclusions 
are presented in Section 6.  
  
2. Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses 
 
Lin (1989) claims that induced institutional change is “a modification or replacement 
of an existing institutional arrangement or the emergence of a new institutional 
arrangement that is voluntarily initiated, organized, and executed by an individual or a 
group of individuals in response to profitable opportunities,” whereas an imposed 
change is “introduced and executed by governmental orders or laws.” Zhang (2012) 
states that imposed institutional changes are associated with uncertain economic gains 
and high political risk, whereas induced institutional changes tend to prevail in 
domains where economic gains are more certain and political loss is limited. Zhang 
(2012) revises the definition of induced institutional change by Lin (1989) by 
recognizing that “the central government collects information as to which institutional 
change will most likely be a certain success.” The information is then used in the 
design and implementation of central government policies (i.e., imposed institutional 
changes). The central government is involved in induced institutional change by 
creating and utilizing a feedback system between the two types of institutional 
changes. We adopt the definition of Zhang (2012) as it has sound micro-foundations, 
especially in the context of the rural land reallocation reform of China. Without losing 
any generality, we define induced institutional changes as changes mainly driven by 
the local government
4
, whereas imposed changes are driven by the central 
government
5
. This definition is different from the “mutually exclusive” approach 
introduced by Lin (1989) and his followers, where induced and imposed institutional 
changes are often used as competing theories to explain economic and political 
reforms in China. Researchers draw a fine line between the two types of change; 
institutional changes are classified as either induced or imposed
6
. This classification is 
a valid approach for institutional changes that do not require the endorsement of the 
central government (and can thus be “induced” by private sectors) or cannot happen 
                                                             
4
 We adopt a broad definition of local government in this study. In China, the local government has 
various levels: village, township, city, or provincial government. Our definition of local government 
does not differentiate among these levels.  
5
 After 30 years of political and economical reforms, local governments in China are significantly 
decentralized and competitive among each other.  Their completion to achieve GDP growth, fiscal 
income maximization and promotion is similar to effective competitions among private enterprises (a 
comprehensive review of related studies on rural local government in China can be found in Smith, 
2013).  Therefore these local governments can not only initiate institutional changes, but also be 
actively involved in imposed institutional changes initiated by the central government.  
6
 See the discussion in Zhang, 2012 on the differences between Household Responsibility System and 
Special Economic Zones for example. 
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without the initiative of the central government (and must thus be “imposed” from the 
top). For example, the setup of Special Economic Zones is an imposed institutional 
change because all special taxation and trade advantages a special economic zone can 
enjoy must be defined and enforced by the central government. The local government 
and private sectors cannot initiate such a change even in an experimental setting.   
 
This framework needs fine-tuning with regard to land reallocation reform. The 
relationship between induced and imposed institutional changes is complementary, 
instead of contradictory. This relationship is determined by the nature of land 
reallocation. Arable land reallocation is essentially the redistribution of the most 
important natural resource in rural China. It has significant impact on agricultural 
productivity, food security, national economy, and social stability, to name a few. The 
outcome of any institutional change in this domain must be politically correct, but the 
economic payoff is inherently uncertain. Hence, institutional change should not be 
initiated by private entities and/or the local government, but should be imposed from 
the top by the central government. Nevertheless, land reallocation is also heavily 
influenced by the social, economic, demographic, and natural endowment 
composition in each locality. For example, villages with high population density and 
mobility need more frequent land reallocation to keep up with the changes in 
population and labor composition. As Chinese villages are greatly heterogeneous in 
these aspects, radical land reallocation reform is likely to create and/or widen gaps 
between villages as well as cause deep political and economic losses. Considering the 
local endowment and status quo and allowing the local governments to “set their own 
pace” in land reallocation reform are important. The central government must set 
achievable interim milestones for the local governments to reach their final targets. 
This process is depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Decision-making Process 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the decision-making process for land reallocation reform. Four 
steps are involved in this process. The central government starts the process by setting 
a national-level target. The central policy influences the behaviors of the local 
government (Step 2b). The local government also needs to consider local endowment 
Local Endowment 
Land Reallocation 
Policy Compliance 
(1) 
(2b) 
(3) 
(4b) 
(2a) 
Land Reallocation 
Policy Target 
Local Government 
Central Government 
(4a) 
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to decide whether and to what extent to comply with the new policy of the central 
government (Step 2a). The combined effects of Steps 2a and 2b lead to a certain level 
of policy compliance (Step 3). The key is that the process does not end here. The 
target set in Step 1 is not the final target but an interim one because localities are 
heterogeneous in natural endowment and the current level of land reallocation policy 
compliance. If local diversity is overlooked and the target is set at the highest level 
(i.e., a one-off radical reform), then some local governments may find the goal 
unrealistic to achieve and lose motivation to comply. The central government sets 
achievable targets by stages. The objective is to motivate worse-off local governments 
to improve over time, reduce local variation, and eventually reach the final policy 
target. To achieve this, Steps 4a and 4b are crucial because they are essential feedback 
links in this process. The central government studies local endowment and the current 
level of land reallocation policy compliance in local governments to decide how to set 
the target for the next stage, where a new circle begins with Step 1.  
 
Figure 1 shows how induced and imposed institutional changes are integrated in the 
land-use policy making of China. Step 2a is the link for induced institutional change, 
by which the decisions of the local government are influenced by natural endowment. 
By contrast, Step 2b reflects the effect of the central government on the decision 
making of the local government, which is the effect of imposed institutional change. 
Steps 4a and 4b demonstrate the link between imposed and induced institutional 
changes. As the last steps in decision-making stage t, Steps 4a and 4b lead to the first 
step in decision-making stage t+1, which is an ongoing process with feedback from 
the local to the central government.  
 
To date, extensive research has been done on Step 2a. Existing studies mainly focus 
on the induced institutional change aspect of the land market of China. Imposed 
institutional change or the role of central government (Step 2b) is largely overlooked. 
No evidence supports the validity of Steps 4a and 4b. To bridge this gap in the 
literature, we propose a theoretical framework to model the dynamics in land 
reallocation between the local and central governments. The framework is based on 
PT (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
 
Different from standard economic theory, PT uses value function instead of utility 
function. The essence of PT is reference dependence, loss aversion, and diminishing 
sensitivity (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Specifically, an individual determines the 
changes of wealth/endowment by comparing the current level with a reference point, 
which divides the value space into a Gain Realm and a Loss Realm (Figure 2a). The 
outcome is classified as either gains (i.e., current level > reference point level) or 
losses (i.e., current level < reference point level). The value function is steeper for 
losses than for gains. Moreover, the value function is convex in the Gain Realm and 
concave in the Loss Realm. These characteristics can be expressed as follows:  
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                                        (1) 
 
where      is the value function of X,   is the reference point that takes non-zero 
values (i.e., reference dependence),     (i.e., diminishing sensitivity), and     
(i.e., loss aversion).  
 
In the last three decades, PT has been applied in a wide range of topics, including 
management (Goldfarb et al., 2012), finance (Barberis, 2013), social and transport 
sciences (van de Kaa, 2010), and other economic problems (DellaVigna, 2009). PT 
gained popularity in various fields because it offers a formal framework to incorporate 
preference (i.e., reference point) in the decision-making at all levels. Under PT, 
individuals and institutions are heterogeneous in their preference and motivated 
differently when facing the same decision. PT is a convenient model when taking into 
account motivation and incentive in decision-making. It has a great potential for 
application in political sciences (Wilson, 2011). However, to date, Zhang (2012) 
remains the first and only attempt in applying PT in institutional changes in China. 
This paper extends Zhang’s (2012) work by incorporating both imposed and induced 
institutional change in the same framework.  
 
Analyzing the decision-making behavior of the local government starts with defining 
and analyzing its value function. Figure 2b is the value function for the local 
government in terms of compliance with land reallocation policy. X is the current 
level of policy compliance. Value function for the local government measures political 
outcome, such as promotion
7
. It is determined by the difference between the level of 
compliance with the current land-use policy and the target set by the central 
government. The following assumptions are made about the value function of the 
local government:  
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 Promotion can be either direct promotion to posts in higher-level governments (Blanchard 
& Shleifer, 2001) or indirect promotion through higher GDP performance and local fiscal 
benefits (Montinola et al., 1995; Jin et al., 2005). 
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         a) Standard model                  b) Application in land reallocations in China 
 
Figure 2: Value Functions 
 
A1: The value function flats out rapidly in the Gain Realm.  
 
Local governments in the Gain Realm are outperforming because their current level of 
policy compliance is above the target. Their political payoff is an increasing function 
of further improvement but flats out quickly after point     because the effort to 
outperform the target level is often not recognized formally or the political payoff is 
uncertain. In response, the local government is not motivated to outperform 
significantly. In Figure 2b, the Gain Realm is divided into Zones I and IV by point 
   . In Zone I, the local government is motivated to improve compliance with the 
land reallocation policy (i.e., to move to the right along the horizontal axis) to 
generate more political gains (i.e., the value function will increase). However, the 
local government quickly becomes reluctant to improve further because extra effort 
does not lead to much increase in political outcome. This region is marked as Zone IV 
in Figure 2b. A essentially captures the maximum amount of extra effort that an 
over-performing local government is willing to make and determines the width of 
Zone I.   
 
A2: The value function is steeper in the Loss Realm and flats out eventually. 
 
The political implication of performing below a standard set by the central 
government does not need to be spelled out. If a local government finds its initial 
position is in the Loss Realm, the motivation to improve policy compliance (i.e., to 
move to the right along the horizontal axis) is high. The Loss Realm is also divided 
into two zones at point r – B. In Zone II, political outcome improves accordingly at an 
increasing rate as the local government improves its policy compliance. However, if 
the political outcome takes too long or too much effort to meet the target, the local 
government becomes less motivated to make much improvement because the political 
outcome is not reaped by the current governors during their term. The typical term of 
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local officials is only five years, and the local government is assumed to be cautious 
in investing in projects to improve rights security that will take more than five years 
to show effects. As a result, the value function in Zone III flats out quickly after point 
r - B. B essentially captures the maximum amount of extra effort that an 
under-performing local government is willing to make and determines the width of 
Zone II.   
 
Zones I and II are the effective zones. Local governments within these two zones are 
motivated to improve their policy compliance. Zones III and IV are ineffective zones 
in the sense that the presence of the policy target (or reference point) does not offer 
much motivation for improvement; local governments are better off doing the very 
minimum or nothing. Having local governments in Zone IV is often not a concern. 
Although non-doing is expected from this group, they still meet the current policy 
target. Moreover, being able to slow down local governments may serve the purpose 
of narrowing gaps between localities. Zone III causes trouble the most. Local 
governments within this zone are left demotivated and thus underperform further. In 
contrast, local governments in the effective zones continue improving their level of 
policy compliance, which results in polarization, an undesirable political outcome at 
both local and central government level.  
 
A3: All local governments share the same value function at a given time. 
 
All local governments are evaluated by the central government and affected by a 
single policy target that is set centrally. Thus, to assume that all local governments 
share the same value function is reasonable. Local governments treat the policy target 
set by the central government as the reference point in their value function; the 
reward/punishment for the same amount of improvement/underperformance is 
consistent for all localities.   
 
Based on PT and under assumption A1 through A3, local governments adjust their 
level of policy compliance to maximize the following value function:  
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
                      
         
 
                               
           
 
                       
                
          (2) 
 
where      is the current level of policy compliance for local government   at time 
period t, and    is the reference point at time t. A and B are defined above. Note that 
Equation 2 allows reference points to vary over time but remains constant among 
local governments. The width of the effective zones, which is determined by the shape 
of the value function, is the same for all local governments and assumed to be 
constant over time. The assumption is reasonable because it reflects the consistency of 
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the assessment scheme of the central government.  
 
Under A1 through A3, whether a local government is located in the effective zones 
[           depends solely on the policy target set by the central government at 
time t (i.e.,   ). Therefore, setting the policy at the correct level such that most, if not 
all, local governments are within the effective zone is important for the central 
government. The process is illustrated in Figure 3. If a radical approach is adopted for 
land reallocation reform (see Figure 3a), the final target level for the central 
government is R, and the current target level is set at the final level (i.e.,     ). 
Without losing any generality, we assume that the goal of the central government is 
            and              . In other words, all local governments meet the 
policy target in period t+T. However, a radical approach is likely to leave some local 
governments in Zone III if the current level of policy compliance      of the local 
government has a large variation. As a result,                   for this 
underperforming group is below the final target level R, and             for local 
governments in other zones. Consequently,             and             is 
greater than           for the whole country at time t+T because the distribution of 
the level of policy compliance is bimodal. When the overall level of policy 
compliance fails to meet the target, localities show greater dispersion.  
 
If the central government adopts an incremental approach and sets attainable interim 
targets, including all local governments in Zones I, II, and IV is possible by setting 
               or               . As illustrated in Figure 3b, the interim 
targets (           etc.) leave no local governments in the ineffective Zone III. 
Consequently,         is steadily moved toward R, and           is reduced. The 
goal of             and               is eventually achieved at time t+T.  
 
To set the interim target               , the central government needs 
information about      and B. As defined above, B is determined mainly by how 
underperformance is punished by the central government and/or the general public, 
which is not difficult to predict as long as the central government sets the assessment 
scheme clearly and consistently. Any predictive errors are systematic and can be 
adjusted in the following period.      is determined by both policy target level 
(    and the social, economic, and geographic characteristics of the locality within the 
same period; policy compliance outcome becomes a function of both induced and 
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imposed institutional changes. The relationship is further illustrated in Equation 3 as 
follows:  
 
 
                 
 
                                                                                                
                          
 
                                                                                   
 
          
where        is the j
th
 local characteristics (e.g., population density and per capita 
GDP) for locality i at time t;        is the determining factor of    other than 
                  ;    are parameters to be estimated; and      and      are error 
terms.                captures the effect of Step 2(a) or induced institutional 
change effect in Figure 1.   is the effect of imposed institutional changes or Step 2(b) 
in Figure 1.    reflects the endogenous nature of   , which means the central 
government considers the current level of policy compliance and endowment of the 
local government while setting the target for the next period. This system of equation 
captures the dynamics between induced and imposed institutional changes in the land 
reallocation reform of China. It is an incremental model, where the central 
government initiates and enforces interim targets that local governments are 
motivated to reach in several steps. The key to the success of this process is setting 
the targets or the reference points in PT term correctly. Land reallocation reform has 
no precedents, and localities are greatly heterogeneous in all possible aspects; thus, 
the central government has to give the local government room to adapt and 
experiment, which is the induced institutional change component of the process. The 
periodical outcome of these adaptation and/or experiment is observed and 
incorporated in the setting of targets for the next step, which is the imposed 
institutional change element of the reform. The relationship between induced and 
imposed institutional changes is complementary.    
 
This framework is theoretically sound because the underlying PT model has not only 
been verified in many fields (see e.g., DellaVigna, 2009; Barberis, 2013), but also 
processes the three components required to study China reform as proposed by Xu 
(2011). Xu stresses that a valid theoretical framework for the study of China reform 
must recognize the uncertainty embedded in the process, the importance of local 
experiments, and the endogenous relationships among all parties involved. Our 
theoretical framework addresses all three issues by incorporating the participation of 
the local government and recognizing the endogenous nature of reference point 
formation under a PT framework.  
 
Anecdotal evidence from China also supports our theoretical framework. Table 1 
gives several policy milestones of land reallocation reform. The final goal of no land 
reallocation has been spelled out loudly and clearly since 1984, but the central 
government provided several flexible interpretations of the rules. For example, prior 
to 1996, both full and partial land reallocation are allowed under certain 
circumstances, whereas full reallocation is not allowed in the second stage 
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(1997–2007). Essentially, land reallocation was not banned outright, but was 
gradually phased out by reducing both the scale and frequency of land reallocation 
over two decades. The flexible interpretation of rules often evolves from local practice, 
which proves induced institutional changes. Clearly imposed institutional changes 
(i.e., central government legislation and policy guidance) and induced institutional 
changes are integrated seamlessly in this process.  
 
Table 1: Policy milestones of land reallocation reform in China (1984–2010)8  
Stage Articles on land reallocation Related policy documents 
I (1984–1996): 
Both partial 
and full land 
reallocations 
were allowed. 
(1) Village collectives are allowed to 
reallocate land through negotiations with 
villagers.  
(2) Reallocation is allowed in villages in 
economically advanced regions and with a 
small proportion of non-agricultural 
workforce.  
(1) "Notice of the CPC Central 
Committee on 1984 rural work" 
([1984] No. 1 document)  
(2) "Policy measures on the current 
agricultural and rural economic 
development of the CPC Central 
Committee and the State Council" 
([1993] No. 11 document) 
II 
(1997–2007): 
Only partial 
reallocations 
were allowed. 
(1) Contracted land holdings are not 
allowed to be reallocated unless due to 
damages by natural calamities.  
(2) Partial allocation is allowed if 
approved by more than two-thirds of the 
members of the collectives. It must be 
approved by the township and provincial 
government.  
(1) "Notice of General Office of the CPC 
Central Committee, the general 
office of the State Council on 
further stabilize and improve the 
rural land contract relationship" 
([1997] No. 16document) 
(2) "Rural Land Contracting Law", 
(RLCL, 2002) 
(3) "Property Law" (2007) 
III (2008– 
present): 
Emphasis on 
the legal 
protection of 
land tenure. 
(1) Protect land tenure by enforcing the 
use of land-use rights contracts.   
(2) Existing land contracts must not be 
changed for a long term.  
(3) Promote land-use rights 
registration/certificate as legal entitlement 
for land-use rights.  
(4) Illegal confiscation of contracted land 
is banned. 
(1) "Decisions of the CPC Central 
Committee on the several major 
issues of rural reform and 
development" (2008)  
(2) "Opinions of the CPC Central 
Committee and State Council in 
2009 on promoting stable 
development of agriculture and 
continuous increase of farmers’ 
incomes" ([2009] No. 1 document)  
(3) "Opinions of the CPC Central 
Committee and State Council in 
2009 on strengthening the balance 
of urban and rural development and 
further consolidating the basis of 
agricultural and rural development" 
([2010] No. 1 document) 
                                                             
8 A detailed account of these stages can be found in Section 3. 
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Figure 3a: Radical Reform under PT  
 
 
 
Figure 3b: Incremental Reform under PT  
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To verify our theoretical framework, two hypotheses are tested based on Equation 3. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (Induced Institutional Change Hypothesis): Land reallocation at the local level 
is determined by the social, economic, and geographic characteristics of the locality.  
 
Specifically, we will test if                   . If the null hypothesis is rejected, then 
land reallocation activities are influenced by local endowment. Induced institutional change is 
a driving force for land reallocation reform.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (Imposed Institutional Change Hypothesis): Land reallocation is subject to 
central government intervention.  
 
For this hypothesis to be true, we need to test if    . If the null hypothesis is rejected, then 
the scale and frequency of land reallocation are affected by the intervention of the central 
government.  
 
If both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are true with the endogeneity specified in equation 3b 
taken into account, our theoretical framework as depicted in Figure 1 is verified. 
Understanding the history and current situation of rural land reallocation reform in China is 
important to verify these hypotheses. Thus, institutional background information is presented 
in the next section. Official statistics are limited and often at aggregated levels, so we utilize a 
unique set of survey data to provide a comprehensive overview of land reallocation in rural 
China.   
  
3. Rural Land Reallocation in China: Survey Data and Institutional Background 
 
In 1999, Renmin University of China (RUC) and the Rural Development Institute (RDI) in 
the US conducted a rural land survey in 17 Chinese provinces. Figure 4 shows the distribution 
of these provinces. The survey was repeated in 2001, 2005, 2008, and 2010
9
. It used a 
combination of multi-stage random sampling and convenience sampling
10
. The survey was 
conducted through home visits, which allowed villagers to be interviewed without being 
noticed or the presence of village leaders. A total of 8,589 complete questionnaires were 
collected in five surveys, averaging about 500 complete questionnaires for each of the 17 
provinces. Over 90% of the questionnaires were from rural areas, and 71.2% of the sample 
came from within 10 kilometers of the nearest town or county. The average household size 
was 4.5 persons, with a per capita agricultural land area of 1.4 Mu (one acre ≈ 6.07 Mu). On 
average, each household had 4.4 contracted land parcels. Respondents completed 7.4 years of 
education and were 46.2 years old on average. In 2010, about half of the surveyed households 
obtained 80% or more of their income from non-agricultural activities.  
 
The 17 provinces covered in the survey homed 77% of the rural population in China
11
. 
Therefore, the survey data provided a comprehensive account of land reallocation practice in 
                                                             
9 The 2008 and 2010 surveys were conducted jointly by the Rural Development Institute, Renmin University of China, and 
Michigan State University.  
10 The survey sampling consisted of two stages. In the first stage, 17 provinces were selected, including all major agricultural 
provinces. In the second stage, a minimum of 100 villages were chosen from each province; up to two households were 
interviewed for each selected village. To ensure sample representativeness, a maximum of six households were interviewed 
in each county and a maximum of three households were interviewed in each town.  
11 China Statistical Year Book, 2012 (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2012/indexeh.htm).  
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the last decade. In this section, descriptive statistics of the survey are presented to provide an 
institutional background for the discussions to follow.  
 
 
Figure 4: The 17 Surveyed Provinces 
 
After the second round of land contracting in 1993
12
, land reallocation decreased in both 
quantity and frequency. First, the percentage of land reallocated since the first round of land 
contracting was 79.9% in 1999 and 82.6% in 2001, while the percentage of land reallocated 
since the second land contracting decreased to 37.5% in 2008 and 40.1% in 2010 (Table 2). 
Second, in the 1999 and 2001 surveys, approximately half of the villages did not have any 
land reallocation in the last two to three years. The 2010 survey revealed that about two-thirds 
of the villages did not have any land reallocation in the last two to three years, and about 50% 
of the villages did not have land reallocation in the last five years.  
 
Table 2: Land reallocation frequency in the 1999 to 2010 survey  
Villages that had land 
reallocation 
Survey year 
1999 2001 2005 2008 2010 
1984 – survey year           
Frequency 1,231 1,256 － － － 
Percentage 79.9% 82.6% － － － 
1993 – survey year 
          
                                                             
12 The launch of Document No. 1 in 1984 marked the beginning of the first round of land contracting. In this document, the 
central government stated that the land-use rights of farmers should be granted for a minimum of 15 years in their land 
contracts.  In 1993, Document No. 11 was launched, in which the central government required land contracts to be extended 
30 years upon expiry, which is referred to as the start of the second round of land contracting.  
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Frequency － 
307 721 631 637 
Percentage － 
20.9% 36.9% 37.5% 40.1% 
 
A large variation in land reallocation among provinces is also observed. In general, the scope 
of land reallocation is larger in plain areas than in hilly and mountainous areas. As shown in 
Figure 5, the percentage of villages with land reallocation was below 40% in Guizhou and 
Guangxi provinces, but well above 50% in Jiangxi, Sichuan, and Henan province. On average, 
a higher ratio of villages in plain areas had land reallocation than those in mountainous and 
hilly areas (Table 3). This preliminary finding suggests that the geographic characteristics of 
villages may be important determinants of land reallocation decisions.  
 
 
Figure 5: Percentage of villages that had land reallocation by province 
 
Table 3: Percentage of villages that had land reallocation by geographic characteristics (%) 
Survey Year Mountainous areas Hilly areas Plain areas 
2005 26.8 33.6 45.3 
2008 27.1 38.2 41.7 
2010 33.9 42.4 43.5 
Average 29.3 38.1 43.5 
 
Respondents were asked for the reasons of land reallocation in their villages and their 
attitudes toward the “No Reallocation” policy. First, we found that household demographic 
change is the main reason for land reallocation. Land expropriation and consolidation are also 
important factors causing land tenure adjustment (Table 4). Second, the majority of surveyed 
villagers (42.5%) were in favor of the “No Reallocation” policy, with significant variations 
among provinces. The percentage of respondents who supported the policy in Jilin province 
(64.3%) almost doubled that in Jiangsu province (35.6%). Details of the survey statistics can 
be found in Table 5.  
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Table 4: Reasons for land reallocation by survey year (%) 
Reason Survey year 
2001 2005 2008 2010 Average 
Demographic change 78.8 73 64.5 66.1 69.6 
Land expropriation 10.8 13.9 10.6 13.1 12.2 
Land consolidation 0.7 5.2 8.6 9 6.5 
Natural disasters - 1.4 1 2.6 1.4 
Commercial activities 2.3 2.5 5.3 2.6 3.3 
Village leader changes 4.7 0.9 2.5 2.4 2.3 
Others 2.7 3.1 7.6 4.2 4.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 5: Villagers’ attitude toward the “No Reallocation” policy by survey year 
Attitude Survey Year 
2001 2005 2008 2010 Average 
Support 42 43.8 45.3 38.2 42.5 
Neutral 15.9 32.5 33.3 33.2 29.3 
Against 42 23.7 21.4 28.6 28.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
As summarized in Table 1, rural land reallocation reform in China has undergone through 
three stages since 1984. The first stage was from 1984 to 1996, when both full reallocation 
and partial reallocation were allowed. In a series of central government documents and 
instructions regarding rural land contracting, “allowed” was used with regard to the regulation 
of land reallocation. Regardless of the conditions laid out for land reallocation, in principle, 
land redistribution is allowed within the 15 or 30 years of the contract term. Full reallocation 
is also permitted, although under tight control.  
 
Stepping into the second stage (1997 to 2007), only partial reallocations were allowed before 
the land contract expires. In 1997, the central government issued the No. 16 document, in 
which the wording of the policy changed notably. Full reallocations were explicitly banned. 
However, small-scale adjustments among a few households (i.e., partial reallocation) were 
still allowed. This document and the 1998 Land Management Law laid out conditions of 
“partial reallocation.” Partial reallocation must be approved by two-thirds of the members in a 
village representative assembly or two-thirds of the village representatives, as well as by the 
agricultural department in higher-level (town or county level) governments. Both Article 27 in 
the Rural Land Contract Law (2002) and Article 130 in the Property Law (2007) stipulate that 
during a contracting period, contractors are not allowed to reallocate contracted land. Under 
these regulations, partial reallocations are only allowed in “special cases in which contracted 
land is destroyed by natural disasters.”  
 
Stage three started in 2008 after a legislation was passed in the third meeting of the 17
th
 
session of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. The legislation stipulated that 
“the current land contracting relationship must remain unchanged for a long term.” Therefore, 
the emphasis of land reallocation practice is contracting relationship stability and legalization 
of land tenure. In two important documents issued in 2009 and 2012, regulations were set out 
for the registration and certification of collective land tenure. Village farmers must be given 
the “full package” of their contracted land, namely, the land, the official measurement of the 
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land parcel size, the contract, and the land tenure registration document. Since then, China 
entered the stage of formal legalization of land tenure and implemented the land contracting 
relationship.  
 
Our survey data reveal the significant impact of the central government’s policies on land 
reallocation behaviors by local governments in China. The tighter control over major 
reallocation after the second round of land contracting is the main cause behind the notable 
drop in the size and frequency of land reallocation, as indicated in Table 2. Our survey data 
show that the percentage of villages that had land reallocation dropped from nearly 80% to 
about 40% after the second round of land contracting. In addition, the frequency of land 
reallocation decreased significantly in all provinces (Figure 5). Note as well that land 
reallocation practice varies with geographic characteristics (Table 3), and villages reallocate 
lands for a wide range of reasons (Table 4). As land reallocation generally poses a threat to 
tenure security, the majority of the respondents were either in support of or neutral to the ‘No 
Reallocation’ policy (Table 5). In this sense, land reallocation reform has been successful in 
terms of gaining local support.  
 
The anecdotal evidence provides informal support to the hypotheses formulated in Section 2. 
Although the central government set the final policy target of “No Reallocation” as early as 
1984, the level of policy compliance varied greatly over time and across the country. 
Nevertheless, the overall trend is movement toward the final policy target, as evidenced by 
the steadily decreasing frequency and scale of land reallocation in the second and third stages. 
The central government adjusted the policy targets in each stage based on the natural 
endowment and current level of policy compliance of the locality. The central government’s 
flexible interpretation and enforcement of land reallocation policies also helped local 
governments to adjust their policy compliance level incrementally. Induced and imposed 
institutional changes are integrated seamlessly in this process. The formal test for the 
hypotheses using econometric methods and survey data are presented in the next section.   
 
4. Empirical Implementation 
 
The data used in this section were retrieved from two databases. Village- and household-level 
data were from the “RUC/RDI China 17 Provinces Village Survey Database,” which was 
based on the survey conducted by RUC and RDI in the US. Per capita GDP and the 
contribution of non-agricultural sectors to national GDP (in percentage) were also included to 
capture the impact of regional economic development and changes in industry structure. 
These data were from the China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy (2006, 2009 & 
2010). Variable names, definitions, and descriptive statistics are given in Table 6.  
 
As the respondents interviewed in each survey were different, the data in this study was not 
considered panel data. Moreover, the survey questionnaire design from 2005 onwards was 
different from that of previous years. Several of the variables used in our econometric models 
were missing from the 1999 and 2001 surveys. Therefore, we used the 2005, 2008, and 2010 
survey data in this section only. After removing questionnaires with missing values, a total of 
3,369 observations were included in the analysis
13
.  
 
                                                             
13 In the questionnaire, when villagers were asked if their village practice land reallocation, about 5% of the respondents 
answered “not sure.” These questionnaires were treated as incomplete and omitted from the analysis.   
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4.1: Measurement of land reallocation activities (    ) 
 
Land reallocation activities are measured in two ways: the villages’ decision to reallocate land 
(denoted as X1 in Table 6) and the frequency of land reallocation (denoted as X2 in Table 6). 
These are the two dependent variables in the present study. Following Brandt et al. (2004) and 
Deininger and Jin (2009), a Probit model was used to model the decision to reallocate land. 
Variable X2, the frequency of land reallocation, was truncated in the left tail at zero. A Tobit 
model was estimated by following the practices in the literature (see e.g., Brandt et al., 2004; 
Deininger & Jin, 2009; Kung & Bai, 2011).  
 
4.2: Measurement of local characteristics (        
 
We classified independent variables in our database into the following categories: geographic 
characteristics (Hill and Mountain), village characteristics (Expropriation and Distance), and 
economic development and industry structure (Nonagr and GDP). Time and province dummy 
variables were also included as controls.   
 
4.3: Treatment of central government policy target (  ) 
 
The treatment of central government policy target was the most challenging task in the 
empirical implementation of our theoretical framework. First of all, this factor is difficult to 
observe or measure directly. Although the target of the central government is set on a specific 
date, when and for how long it takes effect is what we need for our model. However, an 
accurate measurement is difficult to come by. Second, not all of the determinants of    (i.e., 
       in equation 3b) are observable. These determinants involve not only local characteristics, 
but also national factors such as national economy growth target, and social stability 
considerations to name a few. Consequently, a direct estimation of Equation 3b will be prone 
to omitted variable biases and measurement error biases. In light of these data availability 
constraints, we estimated Equation (3) in its reduced form as follows:   
 
                 
 
       
                                            (4) 
 
where   
  is a proxy of   , which is inherently endogenous and has measurement errors. 
Specifically, we use two land titling variables as the proxies of   . The first one is whether a 
village issues land rights certificates
14
 to its villagers (denoted as Certificate in Table 6). The 
second variable is whether “reallocation is prohibited before expiry date” is specifically 
included as an article in land rights certificates (denoted as Article in Table 6). These variables 
can be seen as two interim land reallocation policy targets at different stages, with Certificate 
preceding Article. This finding not only facilitates the test for Hypothesis 2, but also the 
verification of the incremental reform proposition derived from our theoretical framework.  
 
Technically, the inclusion of “reallocation is prohibited before expiry date” as an article in 
land rights certificates seems to be redundant. If a land parcel is leased for 30 years and the 
lessee receives a land rights certificate, then land-use rights should be protected during the 
entirety of the lease term. However, in China, anything not specifically banned is considered 
to be acceptable. If “reallocation is prohibited before expiry date” is not included in land 
                                                             
14 This is similar to the land title deed in a freehold land rights system, except that the rights protected by the deed are 
land-use rights only.  
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rights certificates, the understanding is that reallocation may be permissible. The central 
government’s flexible interpretation of the “No Reallocation” policy at different stages also 
means that contracted land parcels can be taken back if certain conditions are met (see Table 1 
for details). There are gray areas where basic land rights certificates will not offer enough 
land-use rights protection. If such an article is included in land rights certificates, it will 
effectively remove the land parcels concerned from these gray areas. In other words, the 
issuing of land rights certificates offers basic land tenure protection while the “reallocation is 
prohibited before expiry date” article is an extra layer of protection. Certificate captures the 
importance of “formality” of land rights certificates, and Article measures the impact of the 
“functionality” of these certificates.  
 
The central government required land right certificates to be issued to all rural land 
contractors as early as in 1997 and urged the implementation of this policy by issuing two 
important documents in 2009 and 2010. However, the central government’s enforcement to 
include the “reallocation is prohibited before expiry date” article in land rights certificates has 
not been as strong and specific. Therefore, the issuing of land rights certificates is an interim 
policy target to be achieved before the standardization of land rights certificates (e.g., the 
inclusion of the “reallocation is prohibited before expiry date” article).   
 
As both interim policy targets are still in effect, the impact of Certificate is expected to be 
more significant than that of Article. In our 2008 survey, around 50% of the contractors were 
issued land rights certificates, among which only 15% had the “reallocation is prohibited 
before expiry date” article included. This is consistent with our expectation on the coefficient 
estimates of these two policy target variables.  
 
4.4: Econometric methods 
 
Certificate and Article are indicators of two important interim targets set by the central 
government to achieve its final land reallocation policy target, that is, “No Reallocation.” 
These two variables capture the effect of central government policies, but are also affected by 
local policy compliance level, which are also included in model (4) as the dependent variable. 
Hence, the inclusion of Certificate and Article in Equation (4) introduces endogeneity to the 
model estimation process. In Saint-Macary et al.’s (2009) analysis of rural investment in 
Vietnam, they argued that land right certificates were often issued to all villagers at the same 
time, which effectively removed its endogeneity, if any. This is not the case in our analysis, 
where land rights certificates were distributed throughout a sampling period of over two 
decades (i.e., from 1984 to 2010) and across a much larger, more diversified geographic 
region. These temporal and geographic variations were not fully captured by        in model 
(4). If these effects are not accounted for, model estimation will suffer from endogeneity 
biases. We therefore re-estimated model (4) using the Probit-IV and Tobit-IV approaches 
(Woodridge, 2010).  
 
Two instrumental variables were used in our IV models
15
: the percentage of land right 
certificates issued in the county where a village belongs (denoted as Certificate% in Table 6) 
and the percentage of land rights certificate with clauses that prohibit land reallocation in the 
county where a village belongs (denoted as Article% in Table 6). For each village, these 
variables are calculated using data from all other villages within the same county. Since the 
                                                             
15 The choice of instrumental variables is largely based on the approach used in Kung and Bai (2011).  
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calculations of Certificate%i,t and Article%i,t do not include data from village i in period t, 
these two instrumental variables are unlikely to be correlated with     . On the other hand, 
villages within the same county often have commonality in land reallocation behaviors. The 
correlation between these instrumental variables and   
  is likely to be high. Therefore, they 
satisfy the criteria of good instrumental variables.   
 
The validity of instrumental variables was verified using the following procedures. First, 
Pearson correlation coefficients between Certificate and Article and their instrumental 
variables (i.e., Certificate% and Article%) were 0.56 and 0.52 respectively and were 
significant at the 1% level. Second, the standard Probit and Tobit models were re-estimated by 
including the two instrumental variables, and the coefficient estimates for Certificate% and 
Article% were statistically insignificant at the 5% level. The instrumental variables passed the 
exogeneity test and over-identification test
16
. 
 
Table 6: Variable definition and descriptive statistics 
Category Variable Name Variable Definition Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent 
variable 
X1 =1 if there are land reallocations since the 
second round of land contracting, and 0 
otherwise 
0.3 0.46 
X2 Number of land reallocations  0.71 1.56 
Geographic 
characteristics 
Hill = 1 if the village is located in a hilly area, and 
0 otherwise 
0.28 0.45 
Mountain = 1 if the village is located in a mountainous 
area, and 0 otherwise 
0.37 0.48 
Village 
characteristics 
Expropriation =1 if there are land expropriation since the 
second round of land contracting, and 0 
otherwise 
0.33 0.47 
Distance Distance to the nearest county (km) 9.56 8.91 
Economic 
development 
and industry 
structure 
Nonagr Contribution of non-agricultural sectors to 
national GDP (%, county level) 
0.74 0.12 
GDP Per capita GDP (in ten thousands RMB , 
county level) 
1.59 1.76 
Land titling Certificate =1 if land rights certificates were issued in 
the village, and 0 otherwise 
0.58 0.49 
Article =1 if no land reallocation is specified in land 
rights certificates, and 0 otherwise 
0.07 0.26 
Year dummy Y2008 =1 in year 2008, and 0 otherwise     
Y2010 =1 in year 2010, and 0 otherwise     
Province 
dummy 
Hunan =1 if Hunan province, and 0 otherwise     
… …     
Anhui =1 if Anhui province, and 0 otherwise     
Instrument 
variables 
Certificate% Percentage of land rights certificates issued 
in the county where a village belongs 
  
 Article% Percentage of land rights certificate with 
clauses that prohibit land reallocation in the 
county where a village belongs 
  
 
5. Empirical Findings and Discussions 
 
Table 7 presents the results from the standard Probit and Tobit models and their IV 
                                                             
16 Kung and Bai (2011) also use this approach for the over-identification test in their IV models.  
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counterparts for comparison. The sign and magnitude of the coefficient estimates for 
Certificate and Article changed notably in the IV models, whereas the coefficient estimates 
for other independent variables remained largely unchanged. The coefficient estimate of 
Certificate was significantly larger, and the coefficient estimate of Article became 
insignificant in the IV models. The evidence, coupled with the validity test results of the IV 
variables, supports the use of the IV approach in our analysis. The discussions hereafter are 
based on the Probit-IV and Tobit-IV model results.  
 
The test for the induced institutional change hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) 
 
Both models support the induced institutional change hypothesis. Geographic characteristics 
have significant impact on land reallocation behavior. The coefficients of Hill and Mountain 
are negative and statistically significant. Villages with poor geographic conditions have higher 
transaction cost (including measurement cost and negotiation cost, among others) for land 
reallocations, which discourage land redistribution among villagers. This observation is 
consistent with the findings in the case study by Kung and Zhou (1999) and the studies on 
major land reallocation by Kung and Bai (2011). A similar conclusion can be reached based 
on the coefficient estimates of Distance. In villages that are further away from local economic 
centers (i.e., counties in our analysis) are less affected by the rapid urbanization process. Land 
prices will be lower, and so will the transaction cost of land reallocation. This condition will 
encourage land reallocation, all else being equal. The positive coefficient of Distance captures 
the relationship between land resource scarcity and land reallocation decision and frequency.  
 
This hypothesis is further supported by the coefficient estimate of GDP, which is negative and 
significant at the 10% level in both models. Economic growth causes the value of land and 
labor to appreciate. Since land value often appreciates greater and faster than labor cost, the 
net effect is an increase in the relative price of land
17
, and consequently, the need for a 
reduction in land reallocation and well-defined property rights.  
 
The coefficient of Nonagr is positive and significant at the 5% level in all models. The effect 
of non-agricultural sectors is twofold. Although the development of non-agricultural sectors 
generally leads to land value appreciation, it also causes changes in rural demographics. These 
changes will normally induce land reallocation. The former effect is likely to be picked up by 
the variable GDP to a certain extent. After this effect is controlled for, Nonagr mostly captures 
the positive impact from non-agricultural sectors on land reallocation decision and 
                                                             
17 
 From 1999 to 2011, the disposable income of urban households increased from 5,854RMB to 21,810RMB 
per annum at an annual growth rate of 11.6%. Similarly, the disposable income of rural households increased 
from 2,210RMB to 6,977RMB at an annual growth rate of 10%. Meanwhile, land price increased from 
57RMB per square meter to 471RMB per square meter at an annual growth rate of 19.3%. The growth rate of 
land price was twice as large as those of the urban and rural dispensable income growth rates. All statistics 
are from China Land and Resources Statistical Yearbook, 2012 and China Land and Resources Year Book 
2012.
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frequency
18
.  Similarly, rural land expropriation changes farmland supply directly, and 
subsequently induces land reallocations. As a result the coefficient estimate for Expropriation 
is significant and positive. This is also consistent with our findings in Table 4 where land 
expropriation is identified as the second most important reason for land reallocations.  
 
Although rural land reallocation reform is characterized by rapid and radical changes, our 
empirical evidence still supports the long-established “induced institutional hypothesis” (see 
e.g., Hayami & Ruttan, 1971; Ruttan & Hayami, 1984; North & Thomas, 1973; North, 1981 
& 1990). The scarcer the land resources, the higher the cost of land reallocation. Consequently, 
land reallocation is less likely to happen. The long-term effect of these natural endowment 
constraints in rural China will be reduced land reallocation frequency, extended land contract 
term, and improved tenure security.   
 
  
                                                             
18
 The VIFs of GDP and Nonagr are 1.3 and 1.4 respectively. The two variables are correlated, but do not suffer 
from serious multicollinearity problems. Therefore, the net effect of the two variables can be estimated 
accurately.  
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Table 7: Model Estimations 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
Category 
Variable 
name 
Decision of land reallocation  
(X1) 
Frequency of land reallocation 
(X2) 
Probit Probit-IV Tobit Tobit-IV 
Resource 
endowment 
Hill -0.1230 * -0.1196*  -0.6494***   -0.6376 *** 
Mountain -0.2127 *** -0.2030 *** -0.6231***  -0.5969 *** 
Village 
characteristics 
Expropriation 0.4327 *** 0.4356 *** 1.3954 *** 1.4046 *** 
Distance 0.0098 *** 0.0100 *** 0.0309 *** 0.0317 *** 
Economic 
development 
and industry 
structure 
Nonagr 
0.7208 ** 0.7243 ** 2.2369 ** 2.2301 ** 
GDP 
0.0316 * 0.0313 * 0.1180 ** 0.1180 ** 
Land titling Certificate -0.1393 *** -0.1996 * -0.4955 *** -0.6606 * 
Article -0.1723 * -0.1483  -0.6005 * -0.6630  
Year dummy Y2008 -0.0414  -0.0445  0.0912  0.0873  
Y2010 -0.1044 * -0.0898  0.1573  0.1845  
Province 
dummy 
Hunan -0.2745 ** -0.2729**  -0.7427 * -0.7435 * 
Hubei -0.5584 *** -0.5623 *** -1.6659 *** -1.6833 *** 
Zhejiang -0.3398 ** -0.3438 ** -0.8678 ** -0.8620 ** 
Jiangsu -0.3038 ** -0.2945 ** -0.8904 ** -0.8720 ** 
Jiangxi -0.2354 * -0.2298 * -0.5478  -0.5276  
Fujian -0.7998 *** -0.8060 *** -2.5862 *** -2.6180 *** 
Jilin -1.2897 *** -1.2850 *** -4.0365 *** -4.0427 *** 
Heilongjiang -0.7568 *** -0.7634 *** -2.0711 *** -2.1056 *** 
Sichuan -0.1973  -0.1895  -0.2941  -0.2714  
Guangxi -1.1515 *** -1.1452 *** -3.6096 *** -3.6042 *** 
Guizhou -1.7685 *** -1.7728 *** -5.4870 *** -5.4965 *** 
Yunnan -0.9171 *** -0.9140 *** -2.9720 *** -2.9630 *** 
Shanxi -0.3166 ** -0.3339 ** -1.2471 *** -1.2958 *** 
Hebei -0.5819 *** -0.5945 *** -2.0956 *** -2.1413 *** 
Henan -0.4784 *** -0.4839 *** -0.6063  -0.6246  
Anhui -1.3026 *** -1.2937 *** -4.2346 *** -4.2269 *** 
Sample size   3369 3360 3369 3360 
LR Chi
2
 /  
Wald Chi
2
 
 
501.90 415.78 526.52 408.27 
 
(p<0.01)) (p<0.01)) (p<0.01)) (p<0.01)) 
Pseudo R
2
   0.1223 - 0.0672 - 
Note: Intercept terms were included in all models but not reported in the table. *, **, and *** represent the 
10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
 
 
The test for the imposed institutional changes hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) 
 
The coefficient estimate of Certificate is significant and negative. In comparison, the standard 
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of land rights certificates is less important than the certificates themselves. The variable 
Article is not statistically significant in both IV models. This result is also robust in several 
alternative model specifications we used before arriving at the final models given in Table 7
19
. 
The issuing of land rights certificates provides rural land contractors with basic land tenure 
protection. At the same time, it still leaves local governments the flexibility to reallocate land 
parcels when necessary. Local governments are willing to comply even when faced with the 
possibility of reallocating the contracted land parcels in the near future. On the other hand, the 
inclusion of the “reallocation is prohibited before expiry date” article in land rights certificates 
removes the possibility of reallocating the contracted land parcels. Naturally, only villages 
without much need for land reallocation will risk including this article in their land rights 
certificates. As a result, the overall level of compliance is low for this policy target, and there 
are limited variations in the frequency and scale of land reallocation practice among villages 
that complied
20
. The combined effect is the insignificant effect of this policy target on land 
reallocation practice in rural China.  
 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from these observations. First of all, the findings 
support the imposed institutional changes hypothesis (i.e., Hypothesis 2), where government 
intervention serves as a formal constraint on land reallocation behaviors. In villages where the 
central government’s “No Reallocation” policies are effectively implemented through the 
issuing of land rights certificates, land reallocation is less likely to happen and with low 
frequency. This is the net effect of central government policies after local endowment factors 
and temporal and regional variations have been controlled for. A combined force of induced 
and imposed institutional changes has been driving the land reallocation reform in rural 
China.  
 
Second, the different effect from Certificate and Article offers empirical support to the 
incremental nature of land reallocation reform as described in Equations 3(a) and 3(b). The 
central government did not adopt a radical approach to achieve its final “No Reallocation” 
target. Instead, achievable interim policy targets were set and local governments were allowed 
to interpret related government documents flexibly and reach interim targets incrementally. In 
this empirical analysis, Certificate is an example of an early stage interim target (such as 
target r1 in Figure 3b), with Article being the interim target in the next stage (such as target r2 
in Figure 3b). Our estimation period can be best represented by the middle panel in Figure 3b, 
where more villages are concentrated around r1, but fewer ones are close to r2. Therefore, the 
effect of r2 is less significant at this stage. Knowing that r1 is achievable for most local 
governments and has been successfully achieved by a number of localities at this stage, the 
central government demands a higher level of compliance by issuing several important 
documents. On the other hand, the enforcement of r2 is still slow and flexible, with the 
                                                             
19 In these alternative models, we used 1) variables such as the level of standardization of land rights certificates, 2) 
alternative tests for the exogeneity of instrumental variables, or 3) different subsamples. Results are not presented here, but 
are available from the authors upon request.  
20 For villages that have the “reallocation is prohibited before expiry date” article in land rights certificates, the average 
frequency of land reallocation (i.e., sample mean of X2) is 0.4 with a standard deviation of 0.9. For villages that issued land 
certificates without this article, the average frequency of land reallocation is 0.7 with a standard deviation of 1.6.  
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understanding that once most local governments have reached r1 the compliance to r2 can 
speed up. This finding offers support to link 4(b) in Figure 1, and consequently completes the 
empirical verification of the theoretical model proposed in Section 2. It is also in line with 
North’s (1990) argument that most institutional changes are incremental.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The “induced versus imposed” institutional change debate has yet to reach a consensus in the 
studies of rural land reallocation reform in China. Contrary to the common treatment of the 
two types of institutional changes as competing theories, we unify them in one theoretical 
framework under PT. After more than 30 years of decentralization reform, the political 
structure in China can be described as “federalism with political centralization” (Blanchard & 
Shleifer, 2001; Montinola et al., 1995). The central government remains its absolute power in 
the appointment and promotion of local government officials. Hence, compliance to central 
government policies is of top priority for local governments. Meanwhile, a “central–local 
co-agency” system is in effect, in which the central government gives consideration to the 
needs and feedback of local governments (Li, 2010). This central–local government dynamic 
finds its place in all aspects of China’s political and economic development. The land 
reallocation reform of China is no exception. In this sense, the relationship between induced 
and imposed institutional changes should be complementary instead of contradictory in 
China’s rural land reallocation reform. Our PT-based theoretical model provides a framework 
to describe and understand such a relationship. The interim policy targets set by the central 
government serve as the reference points for local governments. Whether and to what extent a 
local government will comply with a certain policy target depends on its current policy 
compliance level relative to the reference point. The key is to set the reference point such that 
all local governments are in the effective zones and are motivated to comply. This goal can 
only be achieved by taking into account local natural endowment and policy compliance level 
while setting central government policy targets. Through this central–local government 
interaction, induced and imposed institutional changes are integrated.  
 
Our theoretical model is verified using survey data from 17 Chinese provinces between 2005 
and 2010. We find evidence to support both induced and imposed institutional change 
hypotheses. The decision and frequency of land reallocation are affected by both local natural 
endowment and central government policy. Our findings also suggest that land reallocation 
reform in China is incremental, with interim policy targets from different stages taking effect 
gradually. The theoretical model and empirical findings provide an explanation to the 
“persistence of seemingly inefficient institutions” puzzle (Kung & Bai, 2011). The 
incremental implementation of the “No Reallocation” policy is the reason behind the 
widespread, diversified land reallocation practices across the country. In other words, it is not 
that the central government policies are not in effect or the local government ignored central 
government policies. On the contrary, the flexibility in regulations at different stages gives the 
local government sufficient space to adjust local policies. This space enables them to interpret 
and comply with central government polices based on local nature resource endowment and 
economy development state. This process moves all localities slowly yet steadily toward the 
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final “No Reallocation” target.  The incremental implementation of the “No Reallocation” 
policy is the reason behind the widespread, diversified land reallocation practices across the 
country; this policy also contributes to the success of rural land-use rights reform in China. 
The theoretical model can be used to study a wide range of government-led institutional 
changes in China, such as affordable housing schemes and the National New-type 
Urbanization Plan (2014-2020)
21
. 
 
Although survey findings offer sufficient support to our theoretical framework, our 
econometric implementation can be improved by using a panel data set. The use of the 
instrumental variable approach helps to alleviate endogeneity problems, but the level of 
improvement depends heavily on the quality of the instrumental variables. When the data are 
collected from a large geographically and economically diversified region across five years, 
measurement errors and omitted variable biases also affect the reliability and validity of the 
findings. In this case, a panel data set will be helpful. However, the fast urbanization process 
in China makes this a challenging undertaking. The rural population has been changing in 
such a fast pace that following the same households in each survey is not feasible. Such data 
will be available when China’s urbanization process reaches a certain level such that 
migration from rural to urban areas is stabilized. Studies using panel data, once they are 
available, can augment our understanding of the rural land reallocation reform in China.  
 
Transaction cost theory is the backbone of new institutional economics (Eggerstsson, 2013). 
However, the static, ahistorical and universalistic nature of the theory limits its ability to 
explain the formation and development of institutions and organizations (Meramveliotakis 
and Milonakis, 2010).  The solution is not to abandon transaction cost theory, but to seek 
improvement by developing a more dynamic theory (Hodgson, 2010; Meramveliotakis and 
Milonakis, 2010). Our PT-based model could be further developed as an attempt along this 
direction. For example, our model involves multiple stages and multiple targets. This 
framework not only incorporates the crucial time dimension that is missing from transaction 
cost theory, but also considers historical formation and development of institutions. The 
model also recognizes the feedback effect of local government’s policy compliance on central 
government’s policy making decisions, which is considered ‘of the second order’ and 
consequently untreated in transaction cost theory (Williamson, 2000). In the same vein of the 
recent development in evolutionary and institutional economics, our model emphasizes 
dynamics, uncertainty and bounded rationality (Hodgson, 2007, Hodgson & Huang, 2012).  
It may also help to reconcile the ongoing debate regarding the role of states in the evolution of 
institutions (see, for example, Chang, 2010). These broader issues are beyond the scope of 
this study, but certainly warrant further investigation in future research.  
 
 
  
  
                                                             
21 The plan was issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council as the first official 
plan on urbanization (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-03/17/c_133192840.htm).  
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